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EFFECT OF EXCULPATORY CLAUSES UNDER THE
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
The effect of an exculpatory clause' in a federal contract was the
subject of two recent cases brought against the government under
the Federal Tort Claims Act.2 In United States v. Kelly 3 the subject of
the contract was the sale of "edible garbage," and the contract provided that the garbage was sold "as is"4 and "without recourse"
against the government, 5 and that in any case where the liability of
the government was established, the recovery would be limited to
the contract price.6 In Air Transport Associates v. United States7 the
subject of the contract was the use by plaintiff's commercial transports
of an airfield owned and operated by the government. The contract
contained a provision which purported to release the government from
all future liability for the negligence of its employees. The plaintiff in
1. Technically, all agreements which exempt a person from future liability
for the harmful consequences of his own negligence may be classed as exculpatory clauses. However, the term is used in this discussion to describe a
clause of a contract which either exempts or limits the liability of one of the
parties for his failure to use due care in the performance of the contract. See
note 5 infra. The term will also be used to apply to provisions in warranties, similar to the "without recourse" clause in the Kelly case (see note
4 infra), which may be construed as including negligence within their
terms; these are similar to the "pure" exculpatory clause. Fire Ass'n of
Philadelphia v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 129 F. Supp. 335, 353-62 (N.D. Iowa
1955) (an excellent analysis of the language necessary to relieve a party
from liability for negligence); Shafer v. Reo Motors, 108 F. Supp. 659 (W.D.
Pa. 1952), affd, 205 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1953) (both opinions discuss the effect
of the "Standard Warranty" which relieves defendant from "all other obligations or liabilities").
The distinction between a release, executed by plaintiff after the claim
has arisen in favor of one of several joint tortfeasors, and an exculpatory
clause, executed prior to the negligence of the defendant, must be kept in
mind.
2. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-80 (1950).
3. 236 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1956).
4. The provision that the goods are sold "as is" prevents representations
made by the seller from constituting express or implied warranties, even
though the buyer relied thereon; however, the provision does not affect the

seller's obligation to deliver goods which comply with the description of

the property-that is, since the government sold "edible garbage," it must
deliver "edible garbage." 46 Am. Ju., Sales § 319 (1943).
5. The "as is" clause read as follows:
"All property listed herein is offered for sale 'as is' and 'where is', and
without recourse against the Government. *** The description is based on the
best available information, but the Government makes no guaranty, warranty,
or representation, expressed or implied, as to the quantity, kind, character,
quality, weight, size or description of any of the property, or its fitness for
any use or purpose, and no claim will be considered for allowance or adjustment or for rescission of the sale based upon failure of the property to
correspond with the standard expected; this is not a sale by sample." Brief
for Appellant, p. 2, United States v. Kelly, 236 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1956).
6. The "Limitation on Government's Liability" clause read as follows:
"In any case where liability of the Government to the purchaser has been
established, the extreme measure of the Government's liability shall not,
in any event, exceed the refund of the purchase price or such portion thereof
as the Government may have received." Brief for Appellant, p. 2, United
States v. Kelly, 236 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1956).
7. 221 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1955).
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the Kelly case, who used the garbage as feedstuff on his farm, alleged
that the government negligently delivered contaminated garbage
to him and that as a result several of his cattle died from lead poisoning.8 The plaintiff in the Air Transport case alleged that the government was negligent in instructing the plaintiff's transport to land on
a runway on which a government truck was stalled at night without
lights, causing the transport to collide with the truck. In both cases
the government contended that the contractual provisions operated
to bar recovery by plaintiffs; 9 in both cases the appellate court allowed plaintiffs to recover. The contract provisions in the Kelly case
10
were held to be inapplicable to a tort action for negligence, but the
court did not indicate whether they were applying state or federal law.
The exculpatory clause in the Air Transport case was held invalid
as against public policy under the law of the state where the contract
was made and where the negligent act occurred.
The Federal Tort Claims Act provides that the United States shall be
liable for all claims caused by the negligence of any of its employees
while acting within the scope of their employment "in the same manner
-and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances,"" and "in accordance with the law of the place where the act
*or omission occurred."'12 The federal district courts are given jurisdiction over all such claims. 13 While it is now well-settled that the Act
adopts local law to determine the liability of the government, 14 the extent to which local law must be applied to other issues presented in
the case is not clear,'5 and this is of peculiar significance where re8. The plaintiff, believing the substance was plaster and that it might
damage the container in which he cooked the garbage before feeding it to his
_hogs, emptied the contaminated garbage in a pasture, and some of his cattle
ate the garbage.
9. In the Kelly case the government also contended (1) that plaintiff's con-tributory negligence in emptying the contaminated garbage in his pasture
was an efficient intervening cause, and (2) that plaintiff had assumed the risk
by his failure to complain when other foreign matter had been found in the
,garbage and by his execution of the contract containing the disclaimer of
warranties. Brief for Appellant, pp. 8-15, United States v. Kelly, 236 F.2d 233

(8th Cir. 1956).
10. But see Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 129

F. Supp. 335 (N.D. Iowa 1955); Shafer v. Reo Motors, 108 F. Supp. 659 (W.D.

.Pa. 1952), afl'd, 205 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1953).
11. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2674 (1950).
12. Id. § 1346(b) (1950).

13. Id. § 1346 (1950).
14. "[Tihe test established by the Tort Claims Act for determining the
-United States' liability is whether a private person would be responsible for
similar negligence under the laws of the State where the acts occurred."

Rayonier Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957). See also Indian Towing Co.

v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955), 9 VAND. L. R.V. 882 (1956). For a dis.cussion of which state law is to be applied under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
see 9 VAND. L. REV. 83 (1955).
15. See Gottlieb, State Law Versus a Federal Common Law of Torts, 7
-VAND. L. REV. 206 (1954); Developments in the Law-Remedies Against the
United States and Its Officials, 70 HARv. L. REV. 827, 890-91 (1957); 10 VAND.
M. REv.450 (1957).
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covery for the tort depends upon the validity of an exculpatory clause
in a government contract. The presence of the exculpatory clause presents questions of whether federal or local law is to be applied, and the
answers to these questions depend in large part upon the answer to
the question of whether the clause is a matter of contract or tort law.
Normally the clause will appear in a contract which has some other
purpose as its main object, but which creates and defines a legal relationship between the parties. 16 Obviously the validity of the contract in which the clause is found must be established by the principles of contract law before the exculpatory clause can have any
validity itself. Assuming the validity of the contract, the creation of
the legal relationship, as distinguished from the purely contractual
relationship, gives rise to certain obligations and duties imposed by
operation of the law without regard to the intention of the parties
and which are independent of the contract. 17 Perhaps the most
important of these duties is the duty to use care in the performance
of the contract. 18 In general it may be said that the breach of this
duty may be the subject of either a tort or contract action; 1 however,
a distinction is drawn between misfeasance, for which either action
will lie, and nonfeasance, for which the contract action alone is available. 20 The election of remedy by the plaintiff may settle the question of whether contract or tort law will be applied in an action for
breach of this duty.21 On the other hand, if the point at issue is
one of substance, the court may look to the "gravamen" of the action
to determine which of two inconsistent rules of law is applicable,
refusing to allow an election. It would seem that in cases involving
personal injuries there is a tendency to look to the misconduct
and the injury as the gist of the action and to apply the tort law,
but where the damage is to property only, the plaintiff is usually
given his election. 22 Further, there is almost unanimous accord to
the proposition that the contract of an infant cannot be enforced
against him indirectly by suing in tort;2 and in the case of a private
16. See Note, The Significance of Comparative Bargaining Power in the
Law of Exculpation, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 248 (1937); Comment, Contracting
Against Liability for Negligent Conduct, 4 Mo. L. REV. 55 (1939); Comment,
Exculpatory Clauses: The Historical Impact of Common-Carrier Law and the

Modern Relevancy of Insurance, 24 U. Cm. L. REV. 315 (1957); Annot., 175
A.L.R. 8 (1948). See also note 24 infra.
17. See note 16 supra.
18. Kenny v. Wong Len, 81 N.H. 427, 128 Ati. 343 (1925).
19. PROSSER, The Borderland of Tort and Contract, in SELECTED Topics ON
THE LAW OF TORTS 380, 384-87, 406-07 (1954).

20. See PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 19, at 387-422 for a discussion of the
confusion which surrounds the distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance.
21. Id. at 429-50, and cases collected therein.
22. Ibid.
23. See cases collected in PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 19, at 447 n.296.
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contract for transportation, tort liability has been found.24 Prior to
the enactment of the Tort Claims Act, the Supreme Court held that the
breach of the government's duty to use care was actionable under the
Tucker Act,2 which permitted claims based on contracts not sounding
26

in tort.

The purpose of the exculpatory clause is to exempt one of the
parties from liability for his breach of the implied obligation to use
due care in the performance of the contract.27 Assuming the validity

of the clause,28 it is, in effect, a means of distributing the risk of
24. McClure v. Johnson, 50 Ariz. 76, 69 P.2d 573 (1937).

See discussion in

PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 19, at 407-11.
25. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1491 (1949).
26. Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U.S. 381 (1939).
The Court said that although the common-law fiction of waiving the tort
and suing in assumpsit could not be used to evade the limitations of the Act,
the breach of this implied duty was derived from an undertaking and came
within the scope of the Act.
27. See notes 14 and 16 supra.
28. An exculpatory agreement exempting a party from liability for an
intentional tort, for either wilful and wanton or gross negligence, or for
liability imposed by statute is generally held void. RESTATEMENT, CONTACTS
§ 575(1) (1932); 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 1751, 1751B (rev. ed. 1938).
Although some courts hold that an exculpatory clause is invalid per se as
against public policy [See Kaylor v. Magill, 181 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1950)
(court purports to apply Tennessee law)], the prevailing rule is that an
exculpatory clause exempting one from the consequences of his "ordinary
negligence" is valid. Thomas v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 201 F.2d 167 (5th
Cir. 1953); Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 129 F. Supp.
335 (N.D. Iowa 1955); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 116 F
Supp. 122 (S.D. W. Va. 1953); Shafer v. Reo Motors, 108 F. Supp. 659 (W.D. Pa.
1952), aff'd, 205 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1953); Bigelow, Kennard & Co. v. Boston,
254 Mass. 53, 149 N.E. 540 (1925); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 574 (1932).
Where, however, certain relationships are found to exist, the clause may be
invalid either as against public policy or because the law will protect those
in need of goods and services from being overreached by others who have
power to drive hard bargains. Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85
(1955). These relationships may be classified as follows: (1) Where one of
the parties has a greater responsibility than an ordinary person-6 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 1751C (rev. ed. 1938); (2) Where one party, by virtue of unequal
bargaining power inherent in the transaction must accept what is offered
or be deprived of the advantages of the relationship-Note, The Significance
of Comparative Bargaining Power in the Law of Exculpation, 37 CoLum. L.
REV. 248 (1937); Annot., 175 A.L.R. 8, 15-20 (1948) (the annotator advances
the argument that this is the most important factor in declaring exculpatory
contracts void); (3) Where the exemption from liability would lead to conduct injurious to third parties-6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1751C (rev. ed.
1938); (4) Where one party is charged with a duty of public service and the
clause relates to negligence in the performance of any part of its duty to the
public-Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955) (common carriertowage contract); 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1751C (rev. ed. 1938) refers
to relationship which involves a status requiring of one party greater
responsibility than that required of the ordinary person); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 575 (1) (b) (1932); Comment, Exculpatory Clause: The Historical
Impact of Common-CarrierLaw and the Modern Relevancy of Insurance, 24
U. CI. L. REV. 315 (1957). When the party engaged in a public service is acting
in his private capacity, the exculpatory contract will be upheld. Thomas v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 201 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1953) (common carrier acting
in private capacity as lessor).
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negligence by contract, and it will bar recovery even in a tort action, 29
apparently on the theory that the action is "founded upon" the con30
It
tract or that the tort duty itself is modified by the agreement.
would seem, therefore, that an exculpatory clause may be treated
either as a matter of contract or tort law. 31
If the courts look to contract law to determine the validity of the
exculpatory clause, the subsequent question of whether federal or
state contract law should be applied must be decided. In United
States v. Allegheny County,32 the Supreme Court said:
The validity and construction of contracts through which the United
States is exercising its constitutional functions, their consequences on
the rights and obligations of the parties, the titles or liens which they
create or permit, all present questions of federal law not controlled by
the law of any state.33

This was, to a certain extent, a reiteration of its holding in Clearfield
Trust Co. v. United States, 34 in which the Court held a "federal law

merchant" applicable to the commercial paper of the United States.
In applying the doctrine that federal law is applicable to government
contracts, the courts have not departed to a great extent from the
general principles of contract law which govern contracts between
private persons. 35 It should be noted that even where the commercial
paper of the government is involved, if the litigation is purely between private parties and does not touch the rights and duties of the
United States, the Supreme Court will refuse to apply the federal
law. 36 On the other hand, one court, relying on the doctrine of Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 37 has held that the validity of an exculpatory clause
in favor of a federal agency must be determined by application of the
29. See Maryland Cas. Co. v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 116 F. Supp. 122, 124
(S.D.W. Va. 1953) (indicating that as between buyer and seller, the parties may
distribute the risks of negligence as they please).
30. Prosser, op. cit. supra note 19, at 445-46. See Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U.S. 381 (1939) (action for breach of duty to
use care in performance of contract allowed under Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1491 (1949), which permitted suits for claims based upon contracts not
sounding in tort); 9 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 196, 201 (rev. ed. 1945).
31. In Lindsay v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 226 Fed. 23 (7th Cir. 1915), the court
applied the tort conflict of laws rule to determine what state law was applicable to an exculpatory clause, and held that its validity as a defense in an
action in tort is governed by the law of the place of injury rather than the
place of the contracting.
32. 322 U.S. 174 (1944).
33. Id. at 183. See Developments in the Law,-op. cit. supra note 15, at 875-87.
34. 318 U.S. 363 (1943). See Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v.
Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956).
35. 9 WILLSTON, CONTRACTS § 195 (rev. ed. 1945) (the fact that one of the
parties is a sovereign requires some distinctions between the law governing
federal contracts and that governing purely private contracts).
36. Bank of America Nat'l Trust and Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 35
(1956).
37. 304 U.S. 64, 114 A.L.R. 1487 (1938).
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substantive law of the state in which the contract was made. 38 However, the more recent decisions indicate that government contracts are
to be interpreted by federal law, 39 apparently on the ground that a
uniform law is needed to avoid confusion, uncertainty and indefiniteness which would result if the contracts were to be governed by
40
local law.
Another approach which the courts might take is to treat the exculpatory clause as a matter of tort law, similar to the treatment of
the defenses of consent and assumption of risk. Logically, it would
seem that this approach would require the application of local law
to determine the validity of the exculpatory clause as a defense in a
tort action. The clause could be considered as a part of the test of the
liability of the government. 41 In Rayonier Inc. v. United States42 the
Supreme Court noted that the test established by the Act is
"whether a private person would be responsible for similar negligence
under the laws of the State where the acts occurred. '43 In other words,
if an exculpatory clause could be asserted as a defense by a private
person, the United States would be able to plead the clause as a defense. The hesitancy among the federal courts to establish a federal
common law of torts would be a factor tending to support this approach.44
Finally, it is possible that even if the validity of the exculpatory
clause is to be determined by contract law, the Federal Tort Claims
Act may be interpreted as adopting the local law of the state in which
the act or omission occurred. This approach is, therefore, a matter of
statutory interpretation. 45 The liability of the government is identified
with that of a private person "under like circumstances," 46 and this
latter phrase may be interpreted broadly to include within its terms all
38. Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 97 F.2d 812 (8th Cir.

1938), rev'd on other grounds, 306 U.S. 381 (1939)

(unfortunately the Court

did not reach the question of whether a federal contract law or state law
should be applied).
39. Pofcher, The Choice of Law, State or Federal,in Cases Involving Gov-

ernment Contracts,12 LA. L. R.v. 37 (1951).
40. The reasoning behind the application of a federal common law of contracts is summed up in the dissent of Justices Black and Douglas in Bank of
America Nat'l Trust and Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 35 (1956).
41. See Lindsay v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 226 Fed. 23 (7th Cir. 1915) (indicat-

ing that the rules of tort law are applicable to an exculpatory clause where it
is pleaded as a matter of defense).
42. 352 U.S. 315 (1957).

43. Id. at 319.
44. Williams v. United States, 350 U.S. 857 (1955); United States v. Taylor,
236 F.2d 649 (6th Cir. 1956), 10 VAND. L. REV. 450 (1957).
45. There is authority which would support strict construction of the FTCA,
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), and authority which would support
a liberal interpretation, United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543
(1951); United States v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 338 U.S. 366 (1949).
Rayonier Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957) may be an indication that
the Court is going to continue to construe the Act liberally.
46. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2674 (1950).
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local law applicable to the case. It has been held that under this phrase
local law is to be used in determining the effect of a release executed
47
in favor of a joint tortfeasor after the claim has arisen.
In one case brought under the Act the validity of the exculpatory
clause was in question. The court held that state law must be applied to determine the validity of the clause contained in a federal
housing authority lease and summarily dismissed the plaintiff's contention that the clause was against the public policy of the United
States.48
Local law was applied in one of the principal cases, the Air Transport case, to determine the validity of the exculpatory clause, although
the court did not indicate whether it considered the validity of the
clause a matter of contract or tort.49 It was able to get around a

troublesome question of conflict of laws by finding that the law of the
place where the act occurred and the law of the place where the
contract was made were to the same effect. 50 Furthermore, the court

relied upon Rushford v. United States5' as authority for its use of local
law.52 That case, however, dealt with a release executed in favor of

a joint tortfeasor, and there would seem to be a vital distinction between a release of this type and an exculpatory clause. The Kelly
case, on the other hand, does not indicate what law it is purporting to
apply, 53 although the concurring judge talks in terms of "doubtful
questions of local law as to which the trial court reached a permissible conclusion."5 4
Each of these approaches is supported by some authority, and each
of them presents a solution to the problem. It is submitted that the
court should determine which approach it will take by weighing certain policy arguments. The desirability of adopting local law to
determine the rights and obligations of parties to a government contract is questionable; indeed, the benefits to be gained from uniform
interpretation of government contracts should be a prime considera47. Rushford v. United States, 204 F.2d 831, 832 (2d Cir. 1953) ("it is
plain that Congress meant to make the proper state law in all respects the
model for the liabilities it consented to accept; and that the 'circumstances'
included as much those facts that would release a liability once arisen, as
those on which its creation depended.").
48. Schetter v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 931 (W.D. Pa. 1956). Apparently
the court did not consider the questions raised by the use of an exculpatory
clause as a defense in a tort action.
49. 221 F.2d at 471.
50. Id. at 472.
51. 204 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1953).

52. 221 F.2d at 471. Since the Act specifically adopts the law of the place
where an accident occurs as the law with which liability is to be determined,
the court reasoned that this adoption applied also to the release from liability.
53. The only indication that the Kelly case might be thinking in terms of
federal law is the fact that in dealing with the limitation of damages clause,
the court referred only to federal court decisions. 236 F.2d at 237.
54. Id. at 237.
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tion. 55 Much confusion and uncertainty will be avoided by applying a federal rule to exculpatory clauses, particularly in view of the
divergence of local law. 56 Furthermore, troublesome and needless
questions of conflict of laws will be eliminated. In addition to the
argument in favor of uniformity, it must be remembered that exculpatory clauses present serious questions of public policy, and
where the clause is contained in a government contract the public
policy questions may be stronger than in ordinary contracts. As
the court of claims pointed out in Ozark Dam Constructors v.
United States, 57 the government is buying immunity by requiring
bidders on public contracts to increase their bids to cover the contingency of damages caused by the negligence of government employees. 58 Further, it may be argued that Congress, by the enactment
of the Federal Tort Claims Act, has established a public policy in favor
of governmental liability for claims based upon the negligence of government employees, and the executive department should not bd allowed to contract away the very liability for which Congress has
consented to be charged. In conclusion it is submitted that the better
approach would be to apply a uniform federal rule to determine the
validity of exculpatory clauses in government contracts without regard
to the form of action.
JOHN B. THURMAN, JR.
55. On the other hand, it has been said that Congress adopted state law to

define governmental liability in order "to achieve within each state a uniformity of rights of plaintiffs whether the defendant be a private person or
the Government." Developments in the Law, supra note 15, at 890.
56. See note 24 supra.
57. 130 Ct. Cl. 354, 127 F. Supp. 187 (1955).
58. Id. at 359, 127 F. Supp. at 190. The court refused to find that the "nonliability" provision provided for immunity for liability where the negligence
of the government approached wilful and wanton misconduct. It is entirely
possible that this case may be relied upon for a federal rule against the validity of exculpatory contracts in favor of the government.

